PSAM 16 - Session F01 Overview

PSAM 16 Conference Session F01 Overview

Session Chair: Svetlana Lawrence (svetlana.lawrence@inl.gov)

Paper 1 WG301

Lead Author: W. Gary W. Rivera Co-author(s): Emily Sandt, esandt@sandia.gov

Evaluation and Analysis of Person-Passable Openings Through Security Boundaries
Researchers at Sandia National Laboratories, in conjunction with the Nuclear Energy Institute and Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Programs, have been conducted testing and analysis to reevaluate and redefine the minimum passable opening size through which a person can effectively pass and navigate. Physical testing with a representative population has been performed on both simple two-dimensional (rectangular and circular cross sections up to 36-inch in depth) and more complex three-dimensional (circular cross sections of longer lengths and changes in direction) opening configurations. The primary impact of this effort is to define the scenarios in which an adversary could successfully pass through a potentially complex opening, as well as define the scenarios in which an adversary would not be expected to successfully traverse a complex opening. This data can then be used to support risk-informed decision-making. At its inception, the project intended to investigate openings that could be found to intersect security boundary layers (e.g., drainage culvert), but through careful experimental design, the testing has sought to further understand the delay characteristics of engineered openings (e.g., piping systems), as well as potential breach points (e.g., cutting through a wall or door).

Evaluation and Analysis of Person-Passable Openings Through Security Boundaries

Researchers at Sandia National Laboratories, in conjunction with the Nuclear Energy Institute and Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Programs, have been conducted testing and analysis to reevaluate and redefine the minimum passable opening size through which a person can effectively pass and navigate. Physical testing with a representative population has been performed on both simple two-dimensional (rectangular and circular cross sections up to 36-inch in depth) and more complex three-dimensional (circular cross sections of longer lengths and changes in direction) opening configurations. The primary impact of this effort is to define the scenarios in which an adversary could successfully pass through a potentially complex opening, as well as define the scenarios in which an adversary would not be expected to successfully traverse a complex opening. This data can then be used to support risk-informed decision-making. At its inception, the project intended to investigate openings that could be found to intersect security boundary layers (e.g., drainage culvert), but through careful experimental design, the testing has sought to further understand the delay characteristics of engineered openings (e.g., piping systems), as well as potential breach points (e.g., cutting through a wall or door).

Paper WG301 | | Download the presentation PowerPoint file.

Name: W. Gary W. Rivera (wgriver@sandia.gov)

Bio: Gary Rivera first joined Sandia National Laboratories in 1989 as an engineering intern conducting explosives and rocket testing. He completed his Bachelors in Mechanical Engineering from Northern Arizona University, then his Masters from the University of Notre Dame. After a short stint with Lockheed Martin working on modern artillery systems, he returned to Sandia as Staff Member in the Explosive Technology Group where he conducted explosive impulse testing, and led the Light Initiated High Explosive Facility. Gary received his PhD in Materials Engineering in 2006 from the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, and taught explosive engineering classes as an adjunct professor from 2007 to 2019. For the last 14 years, Gary has has been a member of the Access Delay and structural assessment department, conducting access delay testing, analysis, and mentoring of up and coming staff.

Country: USA
Company: Sandia National Laboratories
Job Title: Principal Member of Technical Staff

Paper 2 DO283

Lead Author: Shawn St. Germain Co-author(s): Shawn St. Germain ( shawn.stgermain@inl.gov )

Overview of the LWRS Program's Physical Security Pathway
The U.S. Department of Energy Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program's Physical Security Pathway helps define the direction and efforts to develop methods, tools, and technologies which will optimize, balance, and modernize a nuclear facility’s security posture. This LWRS research pathway: (1) conduct research on risk-informed techniques for physical security that account for a dynamic adversary; (2) apply advanced modeling and simulation tools to better inform physical-security scenarios and reduce uncertainties in force-on-force modeling; (3) assess benefits from proposed enhancements and novel mitigation strategies and explore changes to best practices, guides, or regulation to enable modernization; and (4) enhance and provide the technical basis for stakeholders to employ new security methods, tools, and technologies.

Overview of the LWRS Program's Physical Security Pathway

The U.S. Department of Energy Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program's Physical Security Pathway helps define the direction and efforts to develop methods, tools, and technologies which will optimize, balance, and modernize a nuclear facility’s security posture. This LWRS research pathway: (1) conduct research on risk-informed techniques for physical security that account for a dynamic adversary; (2) apply advanced modeling and simulation tools to better inform physical-security scenarios and reduce uncertainties in force-on-force modeling; (3) assess benefits from proposed enhancements and novel mitigation strategies and explore changes to best practices, guides, or regulation to enable modernization; and (4) enhance and provide the technical basis for stakeholders to employ new security methods, tools, and technologies.

Paper DO283 | | Download the presentation pdf file. Download the presentation PowerPoint file.

Name: Shawn St. Germain (shawn.stgermain@inl.gov)

Bio: Shawn St. Germain is the manager of the Reliability, Risk, and Resilience Sciences Department at Idaho National Laboratory. Additionally, he is the principal investigator for the Physical Security Pathway work at INL, an LWRS program that seeks to improve the efficiency of physical security at commercial nuclear power plants through the application of new technologies and risk methods. St. Germain has been with INL more than 15 years and has reactor operations, process engineering and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) experience. He holds a master’s degree in nuclear engineering, an MBA and a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering. He was previously an SRO certified Shift Technical Advisor and Shift Support Supervisor at Columbia Generating Station, a commercial BWR, and a Nuclear Trained Surface Warfare Officer in the US Navy.

Country: USA
Company: Idaho National Laboratory
Job Title: Manager: Reliability, Risk, and Resilience Sciences

Paper 3 VA297

Lead Author: Vaibhav Yadav Co-author(s): Robby Christian, robby.christian@inl.gov Steven Prescott, steven.prescott@inl.gov Shawn St. Germain, shawn.stgermain@inl.gov

Risk-informed Physical Security Optimization for Nuclear Power Plants
The concept of risk-informed physical security of nuclear power plants has recently been extensively explored across stakeholders such as the nuclear industry, DOE, NEI, NRC, and researchers at national laboratories and universities. Risk-informed physical security holds promise for advanced assessment and optimization of NPP physical security postures leading to efficient, economical and safer plant operations. Recently the NRC issued a revision to the regulatory guide 5.76 that transitions from the prior prescriptive regulatory requirement for physical security to newer guidance that is based on reasonable assurance of protection time. The new NRC guidance paves way for physical security performance assessment to be tied with existing risk-based approaches for plant safety and associated metrics such as time to core-damage. This paper presents a novel computational framework for risk-informed physical security aimed at performing analysis such as security design optimization, armed-guard reduction, crediting plant mitigating strategies in security and more.

Risk-informed Physical Security Optimization for Nuclear Power Plants

The concept of risk-informed physical security of nuclear power plants has recently been extensively explored across stakeholders such as the nuclear industry, DOE, NEI, NRC, and researchers at national laboratories and universities. Risk-informed physical security holds promise for advanced assessment and optimization of NPP physical security postures leading to efficient, economical and safer plant operations. Recently the NRC issued a revision to the regulatory guide 5.76 that transitions from the prior prescriptive regulatory requirement for physical security to newer guidance that is based on reasonable assurance of protection time. The new NRC guidance paves way for physical security performance assessment to be tied with existing risk-based approaches for plant safety and associated metrics such as time to core-damage. This paper presents a novel computational framework for risk-informed physical security aimed at performing analysis such as security design optimization, armed-guard reduction, crediting plant mitigating strategies in security and more.

Paper VA297 | Download the paper file. | Download the presentation PowerPoint file.

Name: Vaibhav Yadav (vaibhav.yadav@inl.gov)

Bio: Dr. Vaibhav Yadav is a senior scientist at Idaho National Laboratory where he performs and leads several research efforts in the areas of risk, reliability, safety, security and regulations of nuclear power plants. His research can be categorized into following domains namely, risk-based and risk-informed methodologies, digital twin technologies, cyber security and physical security. He has extensive experience in working with US commercial utilities to develop and implement risk-informed computational methodologies for optimizing physical security. He is currently serving as a member of the Physical and Cyber Security Subcommittee of the ANS/ASME Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management.

Country: USA
Company: Idaho National Laboratory
Job Title: Research Scientist

Paper 4 OL294

Lead Author: Samuel Abiodun Olatubosun Co-author(s): Md Ragib Rownak (rownak.1@buckeyemail.osu.edu) Yunfei Zhao (zhao.2263@osu.edu) Carol Smidts (smidts.1@osu.edu) Abdollah Shafieezadeh (shafieezadeh.1@osu.edu)

Human reliability assessment for physical security: human responses under extreme threats
Human reliability assessment for physical security: human responses underextreme threats Md Ragib Rownak1, Samuel Abiodun Olatubosun1, Yunfei Zhao1, Carol Smidts1, Abdollah Shafieezadeh2 1Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA 2Department of Civil, Environmental and Geodetic Engineering, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA Abstract To further human reliability assessment research for the purpose of physical security, a study on reported human responses during specific real and simulated extreme situations has been conducted. Those responses which are either agitated or depressive in extreme conditions are rarely consistent with responses understood or expected by the public and the media. Rather than responding in irrational and/or self-interested ways under extreme conditions, individuals typically respond in rational and prosocial ways. Though panic behaviors do occur, research suggests this is only when the perception of immediate threats, closing exit routes and a lack of help or resources are imminent. It has been established that typical human behaviors are products of risk identification, assessment and reduction. Almost all human behavior, even in extreme conditions, is based on social norms and the need for attachments. Human factors which affect performance in extreme situations can be categorized as physiological and psychological/cognitive factors. Those factors have been identified and concisely discussed for extreme conditions such as in space/aviation, emergency response operations etc. Those human factors comprise individual, social and situational features such as visibility, fatigue, choice-reaction/response time and working memory/information processing among others. In addition, relationships which exist among few of the factors (extreme temperatures which cause decline in working memory, fatigue which negatively affects vigilance, visual attention etc.) have also been discussed while others which have tendency of dependence need further studies. Moreover, the models of individual behavior under extreme conditions are studied, with the prosocial foundation of human behavior observed. Observations obtained in this study can be used to inform human reliability analysis for physical security scenarios. Keywords: Physical security, human behavior, extreme conditions, human reliability analysis, human performance factors, individual behavior models

Human reliability assessment for physical security: human responses under extreme threats

Human reliability assessment for physical security: human responses underextreme threats Md Ragib Rownak1, Samuel Abiodun Olatubosun1, Yunfei Zhao1, Carol Smidts1, Abdollah Shafieezadeh2 1Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA 2Department of Civil, Environmental and Geodetic Engineering, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA Abstract To further human reliability assessment research for the purpose of physical security, a study on reported human responses during specific real and simulated extreme situations has been conducted. Those responses which are either agitated or depressive in extreme conditions are rarely consistent with responses understood or expected by the public and the media. Rather than responding in irrational and/or self-interested ways under extreme conditions, individuals typically respond in rational and prosocial ways. Though panic behaviors do occur, research suggests this is only when the perception of immediate threats, closing exit routes and a lack of help or resources are imminent. It has been established that typical human behaviors are products of risk identification, assessment and reduction. Almost all human behavior, even in extreme conditions, is based on social norms and the need for attachments. Human factors which affect performance in extreme situations can be categorized as physiological and psychological/cognitive factors. Those factors have been identified and concisely discussed for extreme conditions such as in space/aviation, emergency response operations etc. Those human factors comprise individual, social and situational features such as visibility, fatigue, choice-reaction/response time and working memory/information processing among others. In addition, relationships which exist among few of the factors (extreme temperatures which cause decline in working memory, fatigue which negatively affects vigilance, visual attention etc.) have also been discussed while others which have tendency of dependence need further studies. Moreover, the models of individual behavior under extreme conditions are studied, with the prosocial foundation of human behavior observed. Observations obtained in this study can be used to inform human reliability analysis for physical security scenarios. Keywords: Physical security, human behavior, extreme conditions, human reliability analysis, human performance factors, individual behavior models

Paper OL294 | Download the paper file. | Download the presentation pdf file.

A PSAM Profile is not yet available for this author.