Welcome to the PSAM 16 Conference paper and speaker overview page.
Lead Author: Brian Cohn Co-author(s): Emily Sandt, esandt@sandia.gov
Douglas Osborn, dosborn@sandia.gov
Tunc Aldemir, aldemir.1@osu.edu
A Dynamic, Integrated Approach to Vital Area Identification
The Vital Area Identification (VAI) process is a widely used method to determine which locations at a nuclear power plant (NPP) site need to be protected from sabotage. The intent of VAI is to identify a combination of systems that, if successfully protected, ensure that adversary sabotage cannot cause significant core damage. However, the VAI process does not consider what happens if a vital area is sabotaged by adversaries. Security analysis assumes that the sabotage of any vital area results in an imminent onset of core damage, even if there is other, non-vital, equipment that could be used to perform the same function as the sabotaged equipment.
Integrated safety-security (2S) assessment using dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) has been explored as a method to determine the consequences of sabotage of a vital area, and previous efforts have successfully demonstrated that the 2S methodologies are able to incorporate the loss of reactor safety systems and mitigation efforts on the reactor response for a previously identified attack scenario. However, current methods are unable to systematically identify combinations of adversary targets that would result in a realistic likelihood of core damage.
A method is under development to identify and evaluate dynamic vital areas at a NPP site that an adversary would need to sabotage to affect core damage. The process integrates multiple dynamic risk assessment technologies. System theoretic process analysis (STPA) is used to identify components within a NPP where an adversary can perform an insecure control action, i.e., an adversary action that places elements of a NPP at risk. A dynamic pathway analysis uses these components and identifies all of their permutations that an adversary could sabotage (target sets). The dynamic pathway analysis then determines which permutations could lead to the onset of core damage; the analysis takes into consideration dynamic changes in the reactor state and the full suite of systems that can mitigate damage to the NPP. Finally, these permutations of target sets are used in adversary attack scenarios for 2S assessment to determine which scenarios need to be protected against by the NPP’s physical protection system.
Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-mission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. SAND2022-0824 A
Paper BC226 Preview
Author and Presentation Info
"
Presentation only, a full paper is not available.
Lead Author Name: Brian Cohn (bcohn@sandia.gov)
Bio: Brian Cohn received his doctorate in Nuclear Engineering from The Ohio State University, where he studied dynamic probabilistic risk assessment. After performing research in seismic effects on nonstructural components, Brian began working at Sandia National Laboratories as an intern where he performed research into integrated safety-security analysis. Following his dissertation developing a new method to integrate safety and security simulations, Brian has continued to work in integrated safety-security analysis as a postdoctorate.
Country: United States of America Company: Sandia National Laboratories Job Title: Postdoctoral appointee