Development of Approach to Establishment of Risk Informed Accident Management Class in Severe Accident(#21)

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Severe Accident Management Subcommittee

- The Great East Japan Earthquake of a magnitude 9.0 occurred on March 11, 2011.
- The SAM Subcommittee was set up under the System Safety Technical Committee (STC) for the Standard Committee (SC) of Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) in order to establish the Severe Accident Management (SAM) standard.
- The SAM standard provides technical requirements and satisfactory methods concerning maintenance and update of severe accidents management strategies for existing nuclear plants.
- The SAM standard was established on March 2014.
- The SAM Subcommittee resumed to revise the standard on Sep. 2015.
- The first revision of the standard was established on June 2018 after about three years of discussion and reviews in AESJ.




- Accident management and management classification should be established based on plant vulnerability and latent risk including external events unique to each NPP.
- > Optimized accident management and management classification can be determined based on integrated risk informed decision making process using key element such as risk reduction, safety margin and Defense-in-Depth (DiD).
- ➤ Most recent findings including revised IAEA NS-G-2.15, regulatory progressions in the U.S. NRC and other overseas regulators should be taken into the main text and appendices.



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
Events as Object of Accident Management



Category of Events and Extent of Accident Management

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
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
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Impact Propagation Extent by Initiating Events




AM Optimization and Establishment Block-Chart (2/2)



Classification of Risk Significance using CDF, CFF

• Perform risk assessment using IPE or an alternative method for relevant plant and identify vulnerability in the plant.




Establishment of AM Candidates in SA Progression Phases (Example using PRA results of Internal and Seismic event for BWR)

SA Progression Phases in 4 th layer	Prevent Core Damage	Terminate SA progress.	Maintain CV Integrity	Minimize FP Release	Achieve long term stable st.
Alternative high pressure injection	Middle				
RCIC black start	Middle	Effective			
Alternative high voltage AC power sources	High				
Enhancement of battery capacity	Middle	Effective			
High voltage AC power from neighboring plant	Low				
Low voltage AC power from neighboring plant	Low				
Mobile power sources	High				
Alternative low pressure injection	Low	Effective	Middle		
Alternative mobile injection	High	Effective	Middle		
PCV venting Pursue the world's high	High	ty	Middle	 Effective ↓ 原子力安全推 :	


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- Assume the AM candidates as measure according to each accident sequence group.
- With regard to the AM candidates, verify from the point of view of securing defense-in-depth whether they are appropriately assigned to each level, or not.



- Assess the risk reduction in the case of adopting the AM candidate using existing PRA results and NEI reliability method (NEI 16-06).
- Analyze feasibility and safety margin in the AM candidate using SA analysis code.
- Determine feasible AM and management classification using integrated risk informed decision making process.

Applicability of Semi-Quantitative Approach (NEI 16-06)

 $Q_{FLEX} = Q_{HE} * TM * CC * EF + Q_{EA}, \Delta CDF = \Sigma_i \{CDF_{base i} - CDF_{base i} * Q_{FLEX}\}$


i∮ Capability	Time Margin TM	Command and Control CC	Environmental Factors EF	Equipment Availability EA	Failure Probability	Q _{FLEX} : Unreliability for AM (FLEX)
0.1	0.5 EXPANSIVE	1 FUNCTIONAL I FUNCTIONAL Action Fails	1 NOMINAL 2 ADVERSE Action Fails 1 NOMINAL 2 ADVERSE Action Fails	+0.05 >=N+1 +0.1 N +0.05 >=N+1 +0.1 N +0.1 N +0.1 N	0.10 0.15 0.15 0.20 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.30 1.00 1.00	Q _{HE} : Failure probability for AM TM : Time margin for deployment (transport, connect, initiate) CC : Command and Control (Direction, Staffing for strategy) EF : Environmental factors (temperature, radiation) accessibility, operability Q _{EA} : Unavailability of equipment
	Action Fails				1.00	

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Example of Safety Classification for AM (BWR)



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- ➤ The largest △CDF values are provided by mobile power sources, alternative high voltage AC power sources and alternative mobile injection which are effective against long term SBO due to the earthquake. (Management Class 1)
- ➤ The second largest △CDF values are provided by alternative high pressure injection, RCIC black start and alternative DC power sources which are effective against short term SBO. (Management Class 2)
- Since power sources from neighboring plant using tie line is effective against only SBO caused by internal event, CDF reduction is limited.

(Management Class 3)

Conclusion

- The trial assessment using the SAM standard shows that accident management and management classification can be established based on plant vulnerability and latent risk including external events unique to each NPP, and that the optimized program in accident management can be developed.
- It is significant to assign resources to optimized management based on classification for system modification, addition, maintenance, procedures and training as accident management.
- In near future, it is recommended that the pilot studies will be performed in the existing plant, the feasibility and optimization of the accident management will be verified with checking the applicability.



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Thank you for your kind attention !



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