ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORPORATION



#### On the Development of the Blowout Preventer PRA Model

Jan Swider<sup>ac</sup>, Charley Gallo<sup>bc</sup>, Gregg Walz<sup>c</sup>, and Jim Raney<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Cogoto, Inc., <sup>b</sup> The Frontline Group, <sup>c</sup> Anadarko Petroleum Corporation

### Agenda

- Background Offshore Well Control
- BOP System Description
- BOP PRA Model Development Process
- Results from the BOP PRA
- Summary

### **Offshore Well Control**

Well control – a means of preventing uncontrolled influx of formation fluids, a kick, into the wellbore during drilling.

- Primary well control maintaining the fluid column hydrostatic pressure above the formation pressure
- Secondary well control -Blowout Preventer (BOP) system / barrier integrity





### Why BOP PRA at Anadarko

#### Development of the 20,000 psi rated BOP equipment

- Anadarko 20K BOP equipment internal approval
- Design selection of BOP control system
- BSEE 20K BOP equipment approval

#### Gulf of Mexico Daily Rig Operations

- Anadarko internal approval for unplanned situations
- BSEE "alternate compliance" approvals
  - BSEE 21 day BOP testing approval request
- Reducing Human Factors risk
- Identifying and justifying equipment upgrades





# The Anadarko PRA Development

- Space Act Agreement with NASA
- Small Anadarko internal team to coordinate the process
  - Cogoto, Inc. and The Frontline Group
  - Supported by both process and equipment SMEs
- Phased approach for the generic PRA Studies
  - Blowout Preventer (BOP)
  - Dynamic Positioning System (DPS)
  - Integrated PRA Model (expanded BOP and DPS)





### **Drilling System: MODU and Subsea BOP**



### **BOP System's Size**





### **BOP Subsystems**





#### **Integrated Model Development Framework**



#### A collaborative and iterative process

APC – Anadarko Petroleum Company SME – Subject Matter Expert

#### **Well Kick Operational Conditions**



#### **Well Kick Operational Conditions**



### **Well Kick while Drilling Event Sequence**



### **Example of a Top Fault Tree**



### Human Reliability Analysis on Critical BOP Operations

- Utilized CREAM for the HRAs
- HRA Scenarios:
  - Kick detection and BOP closure response
  - Switching between the Yellow and Blue Pods
  - Initiating an Emergency Disconnect
- Engaged Maersk Training for the kick detection and response HRA



# **BOP PRA Highlights**

- Initiating Events: Well Kick and Loss of Position
- End States: Loss of Containment of Formation Fluids and Closure of BOP as the successful state
- Multiple Event Trees were developed as part of this analysis
- 170 Fault Trees
- Over 1100 Basic Events, e.g.
  - Solenoid / Pilot Valves Failure to Open
  - Shuttle Valves Leaks Externally
- Over 17,000 cut sets generated from the model
  - Using a truncation limit of 1E-10

### **Generic Model's Overall Results**



#### Contribution To the Overall Risk Based on Generic N

# **Summary of Results**

- For the current model, the human is the largest contributor to the overall risk, thus confirming the O&G experience
  - What was not expected was the magnitude of the human's contribution to the overall risk
- Equipment contribution was not as significant as was expecting
  - Multiple redundancies reduce the impact of equipment failures
- The generic model has proven to be great starting point for specific MODU and BOP PRAs

### **Lessons Learned**

- Assure adequate upfront time for familiarization of both the system and the process
- Engage process experts from outside of the industry for a different perspective and internal experts with knowledge of both O&G and PRA methodology
- Establish a standardized and simplified naming convention
- Expect multiple updates and iterations to improve the PRA model
  - Using a collaborative process and phased approach to model development

# Thank you!