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A New Reliability Allocation Method Based on FTA and AHP for Nuclear Power Plant

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Contributed by FDS Team

***Institute of Nuclear Energy Safety Technology (INEST)
Chinese Academy of Sciences***



Institute of Nuclear Energy Safety Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences (INEST, CAS)

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- Hefei Institutes of Physical Science, CAS (CASHIPS)
- University of Science and Technology of China (USTC)

❖ Key programs:

- Advanced Fission Reactor Design and R&D (ADS - CLEAR)
- Fusion/Hybrid Reactor Design and R&D (ITER/FDS)
- Nuclear Safety Innovation Project for Scientific and Technological Development

❖ 10 Divisions



~380 members

Major Research Areas :

1. Nuclear reactor safety

(reactor design, nuclear detect & experiments, safety analysis, ...)

2. Radiation safety and environmental impact

(radiation protection & shielding, chemistry safety of nuclear energy, ...)

3. Nuclear emergency and public safety

(nuclear safety culture, nuclear accident emergency, nuclear power economics, ...)

The major professional/fundamental research basis for nuclear energy safety technology in China to promote the efficient and safe application of nuclear energy.

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Background

- ❖ **Reliability is the ability of a system to work correctly during operation**
 - Measured by survival probability
- ❖ **Reliability allocation determines the reliability characteristics of subsystems and components**
 - Consider a set of top-level optimization objectives
- ❖ **Most approaches have limitations in satisfying all optimization objectives**
 - Equal reliability allocation method
- ❖ **Important external factors**
 - Impact of environment
 - Severity of the consequences




Basic concepts

❖ Basic concepts

- Initial Reliability
- Reliability Goal

❖ Simple Example





Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

❖ Elements


- Top Event (system)
- Gates (subsystems)
- Basic Events BE(components)

❖ Cut set

- A set of basic events
- Cause the system to fail

❖ Minimum Cut-Set (MCS)

- Can not exclude any BE in it





Reliability Allocation Based on FTA

❖ Allocation Criterion

- Importance of MCS and BE

❖ Two Steps Allocation


1. Top event to MCSs
2. MCS to BEs

❖ Advantages

- Clear logic relationship
- Accurate quantitative analysis
- Mature and fast

❖ Defects


- Many ignored factors





Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP)

❖ Hierarchical Structure



❖ Matrixes of Pairwise Comparison

- Criterion Layer to Objective Layer
- Alternative Layer to Criterion Layer



Reliability Allocation Based on AHP

❖ Allocation Criterion

- Facts in Criterion layer

❖ Four Steps:

1. Set up the hierarchical structure;
2. Collect pairwise comparisons at each level;
3. Compute relative weights at each level;
4. Aggregate the relative weights at lower levels to top level;

❖ Advantages

- Integrate and quantify subjective views from experts

❖ Defects

- Need much time for expert judgments
- Neglect available accurate data



Proposed Method

❖ **Combine FTA and AHP**

❖ **Two Steps Allocation**

1. Top event to MCSs
2. MCS to BEs

❖ **Advantages**

- Integrate subjective views and objective facts
- Allocation process is efficient


❖ **Defects**

- Still need time for expert judgments



Second Step: MCS to Components

- ❖ **Importance**
 - From FTA
- ❖ **Working time**
- ❖ **MTTF**
 - From accurate data
- ❖ **The rest factors**
 - From the comparison matrixes filled by experts






Example

❖ Simplified Passive Residual Heat Removal (PRHR) system

❖ Elements

- X_1 : A complex subsystem working in harsh environment
- X_2 : A component that causes severe consequence if it fails
- X_3 : A component in bad working environment
- X_4 : A component in good working environment
- X_5 : An ordinary subsystem with low reliability






Results

❖ Table 1: Information of Basic Events

BE Name	Initial Reliability	Probabilistic Importance	MCS Included
X_1	0.98	0.0533	G_1, G_2
X_2	0.98	0.0007	G_4
X_3	0.97	0.0489	G_1, G_3
X_4	0.97	0.0298	G_3, G_4
X_5	0.75	0.0199	G_2, G_4



Results

- ❖ Initial reliability of system: 0.993359
- ❖ Reliability goal of system: 0.998000

- ❖ Table 2: Information of Minimum Cut-sets

MCS Name	Reliability Goal	BE Name
G_1	0.99500	X_1, X_3
G_2	0.99910	X_1, X_5
G_3	0.99940	X_3, X_4
G_4	0.99985	X_2, X_4, X_5



Results

❖ Table 3: Allocation results

BE Name	Initial Reliability	Reliability goal of FTA	Reliability goal of AHP	Reliability goal of the new method
X_1	0.98	0.9974	0.9895	0.9919
X_2	0.98	0.9800	0.9841	0.9885
X_3	0.97	0.9744	0.9801	0.9837
X_4	0.97	0.9754	0.9855	0.9834
X_5	0.75	0.7565	0.8149	0.8158

❖ Reliability goal of X_1 is too high to reach

- Complex subsystem working in harsh environment

❖ Reliability goal of X_2 does not change

- Although the consequence of X_2 failure is very severe



Discussion and Conclusions

- ❖ **Same rationality as AHP method**
 - Consider more factors than FTA
 - Even improve the accuracy of results of AHP method based on importance from quantitative analysis of FTA
- ❖ **The allocation process is more efficient than AHP**
 - Information from FTA and accurate data
 - Less time for expert judgments
- ❖ **This method has been implemented in RiskA**
 - Probabilistic Safety & Reliability Analysis Program



RiskA: Probabilistic Safety & Reliability Analysis Program from INEST,CAS

❖ Main Functionalities

- **Reliability Data Management**
- **Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)**
- **Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)**
- **Event Tree Analysis (ETA)**
- **Importance Analysis**
- **Sensitivity Analysis**
- **Uncertainty Analysis**

❖ Advanced Functionalities

- **Reliability Allocation**
- **Fault Diagnosis**





Model Recognition and Sharing

❖ FT and ET models can be imported and exported

- FTP
- XML
- RSA
- Format of RiskA

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE open-psa>
- <open-psa>
  - <define-fault-tree name="r1">
    - <define-gate name="r1">
      - <and>
        <event name="g1"/>
        <event name="g2"/>
      </and>
    </define-gate>
  - <define-gate name="g1">
    - <or>
      <event name="e1"/>
      <event name="e2"/>
      <event name="e3"/>
      <event name="g3"/>
    </or>
  </define-gate>
</open-psa>
```

Open Formats




Format of RiskA



Co-modeling

- ❖ Standalone Version and Online Version
- ❖ Version Control and User Permission





Analysis

❖ Fault tree Analysis

- Improved Zero-suppressed Binary Decision Diagram (ZBDD)

❖ Uncertainty Analysis

- Optimized Latin hypercube sampling

❖ Parallel Computing

- Simultaneous multiple cases calculation
- Can be deployed on computer cluster



Applications

❖ Computing Engine

- The Third Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant Risk Monitor (TQRM)

❖ Probabilistic Safety Analysis

- International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER)
- Experimental Advanced Superconducting Tokamak (EAST)

❖ Reliability Analysis

- Accelerator Driven Nuclear Waste Transmuter (ADS)
- FDS series fusion reactors
- Laser Radar System



Contact Information

- ❖ **Institute of Nuclear Energy Safety Technology (INEST), Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)**
- ❖ **Website**
 - www.fds.org.cn
- ❖ **Software Service**
 - software@fds.org.cn
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First step: Top to Minimum Cut-Sets (MCSs)

- ❖ **Allocate reliability from Top (system) to Minimum Cut-Sets (MCSs)**
- ❖ **The procedure includes:**
 1. Order all MCSs, and choose k low reliability MCSs
 2. Use the importance of each MCS as relative weight to calculate the reliability goal of each MCS
- ❖ **Notices**
 - k low reliability MCSs should cover all basic events
 - k should not be too large for efficiency



Second Step: MCS to Components

- ❖ **Allocate reliability from MCSs to components (basic events)**
- ❖ **The procedure includes:**
 1. **Order all basic events, and choose / low reliability basic events**
 2. **Set up the hierarchical structure, 9 factors**
 3. **Construct the input matrixes of pairwise comparisons (IMPC)**
 4. **Examine the consistency of the IMPC**
 5. **Compute global relative weights**
 6. **Compute reliability goal of basic events based on global relative weights**



Results Optimization

- ❖ **Get reliability goal of all basic events**
 - Intersections of different MCSs
 - Reliability goal of one basic event may have different values

- ❖ **Each component should have one value**

- ❖ **The maximum value is selected**
 - Guarantee the reliability goal of the system